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1 Introduction
Since October 2000, Israel and the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza Strip have
become entangled in a bloody confrontation that claimed thousands of casualties from
both sides. After countless efforts at mediation by the international community, the
crisis has shown no sign of abating. In fact its intensity has been continuously
heightened by the dynamics of escalation from one side and counter-escalation from the
other side. This has shattered the hopes for peaceful resolution to the Palestinian-Israeli
conflict that were raised by the signing of the Oslo Accord in 1993.
The attempt of the international community to put an end to the violence and rescue the
Oslo Accord proved to be a futile effort because the accord itself is flawed and cannot
be resurrected. The accord, as well as the present international efforts led by US to put
life into it, failed to address two central issues of the conflict: the Palestinian right to
sovereignty over their land and their right to free their economy from its colonial
dependency on the Israeli economy. Not recognizing the centrality of these two issues,
the Oslo Accord and the present international efforts at reviving it, deal with symptoms
of the conflict (violence) and ignore its cause (sovereignty).
This paper is confined to the economic aspects of the conflict. It sets out to analyse the
economic relations between the Israeli economy and the Palestinian economy of the
West Bank and Gaza Strip. The aim is to analyse the dynamic relation between the two
that has led to the collapse of the Oslo Accord. This analysis will reveal the various
anomalies in the relation, whose removal is a prerequisite for any serious and genuine
effort at reviving the peace process and allowing the economic dimension to promote
security for both parties. The second section outlines the historical perspective, tracing
the events that took place from the signing of the Oslo Accord in 1993 to the present
conflict. The third section provides the theoretical framework within which the
relationship between the two economies is examined. It focuses on the interconnections
between a large, advanced economy and a small, poor neighbour, as formulated by
Myrdal (1957), Thirwall (1994), and Krugman (1998). It identifies the positive
consequences of any linkage between the two economies, which tend to help the small
economy expand, develop and grow; these are called the spread effects. It also identifies
negative repercussions that tend to work in the opposite direction and thus retard the
evolution of the small economy, reinforcing its underdevelopment; these are called the
backwash effects. In the fourth section practices and policies of successive Israeli
governments are identified as responsible for incapacitating the normal operation of the
market forces in the Palestinian areas, blocking the positive spread effects and
bolstering the backwash effects as the dominant force in the relation. Section five
explores the changes brought about by limited self-rule (the Oslo Accord) and illustrates
how these changes have failed to alter the essential dynamics of Israeli activities, and
thus could not arrest the cumulative movement of the backwash effects which continue
to weaken the Palestinian economy. Finally, conclusions relating to the present situation
of the Palestinian economy and the prospects for future relations with the Israeli
economy based upon a more equitable foundation are presented.2
2 The Oslo Accord and limited self-rule
On 13 September 1993, Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) signed a
Declaration of Principles (DoP) in Washington DC, recognizing each other and
resolving to implement some specified steps gradually, as well as negotiate the end of
their historical conflict. As specified in the DoP, in May 1994, a Palestinian limited
self-government was established over parts of the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
The new arrangement engendered high expectations of improvement for the Palestinian
areas. Self-government was envisaged as setting free the West Bank and Gaza Strip
from the harsh conditions of the Israeli occupation, which began with the seizing of the
territories by Israel from Jordan and Egypt during the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, and
creating a new environment conducive to the expansion of production and trade. Peace
and stability would encourage domestic economic activities, attract foreign investment,
and open the door to regional coordination and integration. In addition, the international
community’s commitment to underwrite part of the cost of the Palestinian
reconstruction programme was seen as supplying much needed capital and foreign
exchange.1 Seven years of limited self-rule, however, have not brought about any of
these expected improvements. On the contrary, the economic situation in the West Bank
and Gaza has deteriorated steadily: reaching crisis proportions during the 1996-97
period, with a sharp increase in unemployment, a drastic decline in trade, an
unprecedented spread of poverty, and a overall condition usually associated with
economies under siege (Roy 1998: 20).
The Israeli government blames the Palestinian Authority (PA) for the deterioration of
the economic situation. The failure of the PA to prevent Hamas, a militant Palestinian
organization dedicated to ousting the Israeli presence from the territories, from carrying
out violent acts against Israel has led the Israeli government to close its borders to the
Palestinian territories, causing a drastic decline in Palestinian employment, production
and trade.2 The PA, on the other hand, while condemning the acts of Hamas, points to
the Israeli government’s actions as the real culprit in creating an atmosphere of conflict
and strife conducive to violence. These actions include the continued building of Jewish
settlements in the West Bank and Gaza, reneging on many agreements signed with the
PA, and a disposition regarding self-rule as merely another form of occupation.
As is often the case, fierce polemics about responsibility and blame are arguments over
symptoms rather than causes. They represent a smokescreen, disguising the failure to
address deep-rooted problems that provide the fertile ground for violence. The inability
of limited self-rule to deliver on its promises during the first seven years of the interim
period is due primarily to the fact that it was an outcome of a flawed process; the Oslo I
and II Accords, the Paris Protocol, and the Wye River Memorandum.3 These accords
                                                
1  The US administration convened an international conference of 42 countries during October 1993,
which promised 2.4 billion dollars to help the Palestinian reconstruction and development programme
(1994-99).
2  The circle of violence took a very dangerous turn with the Hebron massacre in February 1994, when a
Jewish extremist murdered several Muslims at prayer in the mosque. It was escalated by attacks by
Hamas suicide bombers on civilians in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv, which peaked during October 1994
and again in February and March 1996.
3  The DoP is known also as Oslo I. On 29 April 1994 in Paris, the two sides signed the ‘Protocol on
Economic Relations between the Government of Israel and the PLO, representing the Palestinian3
simply did not deal with the crux of the problem, which is the dispute over sovereignty,
and they did not change the colonial-like relationship between the Israeli and Palestinian
economies. Postponing the resolution of this core problem to a later date of final status
negotiations, one of the main outcomes of the Oslo process, has proved to be harmful to
the peace process in general. At the political level, it has furnished the enemies of the
accord, from both sides, with sufficient time to derail its implementation.
At the economic level, despite some improvements in the policy environment brought
about by establishing a Palestinian national authority and dismantling some of the
occupation’s harmful structures, the continued Israeli confiscation of Palestinian lands
and the building of new Jewish settlements, as well as expanding old ones, have created
a poisonous atmosphere of strife. The relapse into the old habits of daily scuffles and
clashes between the Israeli security forces and the Palestinians protesting Israeli
settlements and land policies has suffocated the euphoric mood that had greeted the
signing of the first peace accord. It led to deterioration in economic relations and
prevented any serious movement toward reconstruction and development of the
Palestinian economy. Indeed, this untenable situation precipitated the eruption of the Al
Aqsa Intifada on 28 September 2000. This second Palestinian uprising,4 which passed
its twenty-first month at the time of writing (June 2002), was started by Palestinian
youth demonstrating against the occupation and throwing stones at Israeli soldiers.5
Israel reacted by unleashing its superior military force, equipped with the most
advanced technology, taking a terrible toll on life. Palestinian militant organizations
reacted to this Israeli brutality by attacking Israeli soldiers and settlers, and by a wave of
suicide bomb attacks on Israeli cities, which resulted in the death of scores of Israeli
civilians.6 This has created a vicious circle of escalation from one side and counter-
escalation from the other side, creating a climax at the end of March 2002 with the
Israeli army reinvading most of the West Bank. This campaign, which is considered the
largest Israeli military operation in the Palestinian territory since the 1967, has resulted
in the total destruction of the PA’s security and police apparatus in the West Bank,
overwhelming damage to the Palestinian infrastructure, the ransacking and looting of
most ministries and various private institutions, and the arrest of thousands of
Palestinians activists and officials.7,8 In 2002, after four weeks the Israeli army
                                                                                                                                              
People’. This sixty-page document ‘establishes the contractual agreement which will govern the
economic relations between the two sides, and which will cover the West Bank and Gaza Strip during
the interim-period’. On 28 September 1995, the Israeli- Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West
Bank and Gaza Strip (known as Oslo II) was signed. The last agreement, the Wye River
Memorandum, was signed on 23 October 1998.
4  The first Palestinian Intifada erupted at the end of 1987 and continued intermittently till the signing of
the Oslo Accord in 1993
5  The clashes started when Ariel Sharon, the leader of the right-wing party, the Lukud, made a
provocative visit to the Harem Al-Sharif (the Noble Sanctuary) in Jerusalem, accompanied by 1,000
Israeli police on 28 September 2000.
6 By the end of June 2002, 1,759 people had been killed on the Palestinian side, and 574 on the Israeli
side.
7  The campaign is known as Operation Defensive Wall, which was waged on 29 March 2002, as a
retaliatory operation to a Palestinian suicide bomb that killed 27 and injured scores of Israeli in the
city of Natania two days before.4
withdrew from inside the major towns and refugee camps of the West Banks and
relocated to positions surrounding them. However, this situation did not last more than a
few weeks. In a response to a new wave of suicide bombers, the Israel army went back
and reoccupied most of West Bank on 16 June 2002, signifying the final collapse of the
Oslo Accord.
As a result of all of this, the economic situation has deteriorated massively. By the end
of April, Palestinians losses had reached US$  3.49 billion, which is equivalent to
three-quarters of the Palestinian GDP.9 According to the World Bank the
unemployment rate in the Palestinian territories has passed the 50 per cent mark, and at
least 50 per cent of Palestinians are living below the poverty line of US$ 2 a day as of
April. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) has warned of
the dangers of deteriorating health and nutrition status of women and children.10
The ongoing situation shows no signs that an end to the violence and a return to
peaceful negotiations are near. On the contrary, escalation and its negative responses
have been dominating the politics of both sides and threatening to engulf the whole
region in another round of Arab-Israeli wars.
It is both surprising and frustrating that the international community has failed so far to
exert enough pressure on the two parties to bring about a peaceful application of the UN
resolutions regarding the conflict. There is a growing concern among the Europeans,
and certainly among the Arabs, that the complete support of the US government for
Israel is one of the crucial factors contributing to the failure of international diplomacy
to resolve the conflict. It seems that the American administration after 11 September
2001, and as part of its declared war on terrorism, has de-legitimatized the Palestinian
leadership as tainted with terrorism, and sanctioned the Israeli government policies of
continuing occupation, expansion of Jewish settlements, confiscation of lands and
demolishing houses as legitimate practices of fighting terrorism.11 This perspective is
                                                                                                                                              
8  Several media and human rights organizations have accused the Israeli army of committing atrocities
and war crimes during the Operation Defensive Wall, in particular during the battle that took place in
Jenin refugee camp. Reacting to these claims, the UN Security Council voted to send a fact-finding
mission to investigate what happened in Jenin, and the General-Secretary named a team of
distinguished personalities to carry out the mission. Israel, however, refused to cooperate with the
mission and subsequently the team was disbanded.
9  This is an estimate by the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS). It includes US$ 2,038
million of direct losses to economic activities, US$ 757 million losses of Palestinian workers who lost
their work in Israel, and US$ 1000.6 million losses caused by damages of Palestinian assets and
infrastructure (PCBS 2002).
10 It is reported that 12.5 per cent of women were either mildly or strongly anaemic while that was the
case with 21.5 per cent of the children (The Chicago Tribune, 19 July 2002).
11 On 24 June 2002, President George Bush made a policy speech on the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. He
did not ask Israel to lift the curfew imposed on most of the cities in the West Bank and withdraw its
army from the Palestinian authority’s areas, nor did he ask to put a stop to the expansion of Jewish
settlements on Palestinian land. But he called on the Palestinians to change their leadership and
embark on a programme of reform. The speech was treated in most European and Arab media as one-
sided ‘vision’ that will do little to bring peace to the Middle East. In the words of The Economist
(29  June 2002), ‘even Israelis admitted that the peace plan George Bush and his divided5
most unfortunate, as it does not distinguish between terrorism and legitimate resistance
activities in pursuance of self-determination and freedom from foreign occupation.
To revive the peace process, the US administration needs to take a more even-handed
approach. While it is understandable that it should condemn certain activities of the
Palestinians regarding targeting Israeli civilians, it should also condemn the excessive
use of force by the Israeli army that has resulted in Palestinian casualties being three
times larger than that of the Israelis. At the same time, the US will not be credible as an
honest broker between the two parties unless it adheres to international law and declares
that Israeli settlements of the occupied territories to be illegal, and incompatible with
peaceful solution. A new balanced American position, and allowing for an effective role
to be played by the UN, EU, and Russia, would go a long way in cementing the road
toward creating a new peace process that avoids the mistakes of Oslo, especially those
in economic relations.
2 The dynamic relations between the Israeli and Palestinian economies
In 1967 Israel occupied the West Bank and Gaza Strip and integrated their markets into
its own. The Israeli economy at that time was around ten times the size of the
Palestinian economy, its product diversification was much greater, and the
manufacturing sector’s GDP share was more than four times larger. The differences in
size and structure were thus between a large, advanced, and rich economy and a small,
underdeveloped, and poor economy. Both theoretical analysis and empirical studies
suggest that the dynamics of such a relationship always generate two opposing forces
that disproportionately affect the smaller economy and shape its development. A
favourable repercussion is an increased demand for the products of the small economy,
a diffusion of technology and knowledge, as well as other spread effects resulting from
the geographical proximity to a large market leading to subcontracting, joint ventures,
and coordination in tourism and other services. Unfavourable repercussions arise from
the disappearance of many industries in the small economy, its confinement to
producing low-skill goods, and the emigration of a sizeable segment of its labour force
to the neighbouring economy, as well as to other countries. These effects are known in
the literature as backwash effects or polarization effects, arising from the capability of
efficient, large-scale industries in the advanced economy to out-compete inefficient
small-scale industries in the less advanced economy, and attract its labour and capital.12
From the perspective of the small economy, therefore, the crucial question is the
balance of the dynamic impacts. To what extent would they help its own development,
and to what extent would they reinforce underdevelopment? Among the factors that
determine the relative strength of these two trends is the degree of integration between
the two sides, which can be appreciated by considering trade. A removal of tariff and
other barriers to trade between the two countries would increase the exports of the small
                                                                                                                                              
administration set forth this week could just as well have been written by their own prime minister,
Ariel Sharon’.
12 For a good analysis of these effects, see Krugman and Obstfeld (1994), Krugman (1998), and
Thirlwall (1994).6
economy to its neighbour, as trade between them takes on a pattern based on
comparative advantage. This level of exports, however, will not be sustained if free
trade between the two countries is accompanied by a common external tariff (as in
custom union), where the tariff is substantial and is set, as it most likely would be, with
the objective of protecting the advanced economy’s industries. Such protection would
increase the price of intermediate and capital goods imported by the small economy, and
thus raise its cost of production, so compromising its comparative advantage.
Further measures of integration between the two economies, such as allowing free
movement of labour and capital, would significantly reduce the export of goods from
the small to the large economy, as the export of labour services would be substituted for
the export of goods. In other words, free trade and free mobility of factors would
gradually wipe out trade based on comparative advantage and confine it to trade based
on absolute advantage, resulting in the small economy exporting low-skilled goods and
importing high-skilled goods, thus ‘locking in’ its poverty and ensuring it remains a
backward region in an otherwise advanced country.13 Had the integration between the
two countries been allowed to proceed at a slower-paced free trade between the two
sides first, without a common external tariff and free mobility of factors, producers in
the small economy would have been able to expand production by taking advantage of
scale economies, and enhancing a comparative advantage favourable to development. In
short, a slow pace of integration would improve the comparative advantage of the small
economy by tapping the spread effects, whereas a hasty integration would destroy
comparative advantage through the working of the polarization effects.
Immediately, after occupation in 1967, Israel imposed on the West Bank and Gaza Strip
a custom union trade arrangement that increased tariffs approximately fourfold
(German-Arab Chamber of Commerce 1995: 57). Naturally, this drastic change, along
with the many non-tariff barriers applied by Israel, resulted in a huge trade diversion
away from neighbouring Arab countries and the rest of the world toward the Israeli
market, raising the cost of capital and intermediary goods to Palestinian producers that
effectively wiped out their competitive edge in foreign markets. Recent studies show,
for instance, that the cost of garment production in the West Bank is larger than that of
Jordan by a factor of 2.17 (Makhool 1996:  34). An important component in that
difference is due to the fact that Palestinian producers pay double the price for their
imported Turkish textiles, compared to the superior-quality East Asian materials
imported by Jordanian producers. The Palestinians cannot import the Asian textiles
because of the prohibitive tariff imposed by Israel to protect its own industry. Similarly,
the cost of agricultural products, pharmaceuticals, and shoes in Jordan is lower than in
Palestine partly because of the differences in imported input prices. Another reason for
the high cost of Palestinian production in both agriculture and industry is the relatively
high wage rate. It is estimated that wages of Palestinian workers are larger than those in
Jordan by a factor of two to three in agriculture, a factor of two in the garment industry,
                                                
13 The advanced economy is generally more productive in the majority of sectors. The small economy
will be able to export to the large economy goods that have no absolute advantage in production,
provided it has smaller productivity disadvantages and its labour accepts wages lower than those
prevailing in the large economy. In the long run, no industry will survive in the small economy unless
it enjoys an absolute advantage over its counterpart in the large economy, and that means a
predominance of low-skilled industries.7
and a factor of 2.3 in the shoe industry.14 These high wages are the result of distortions
in the labour market created by the hiring of Palestinian commuters to work by the day
in Israel. A practice started with the occupation and steadily increased to account for
almost one-third of the Palestinian labour force in the 1990s (UNCTAD 1998: 47).
Naturally, this trade arrangement has increased the cost of Palestinian production, causing
Palestinian exporters to lose their comparative advantage in traditional neighbouring
markets. More importantly, economies of scale realized by the advanced Israeli
manufacturers enabled them to undercut the small Palestinian firms producing for the
domestic market, disrupting and replacing Palestinian artisan and small industry production.
While these adverse polarization effects were at work, various positive spread effects were
also introduced by the occupation at the same time. These include the new opportunities
that opened up for employment in and trade with Israel, and for some transfer of
technology. The income earned by Palestinians working in Israel contributed to rapidly
rising money income and, in turn, to increased demand and domestic economic activities.
Palestinian agriculture benefited from a transfer of technology from the more advanced
Israeli agriculture and this contributed to increased exports of some agriculture products to
Israel. The cumulative impact of this expansion in economic activities helped increase
income, saving, and investment, especially investment in residential construction.
3 The role of Israeli measures in creating an adverse path dependence
Had the economic relations between Israel and the Palestinian territory been confined
entirely to the dynamic forces described above, the positive spread effects would probably
have dominated the adverse polarization effects by the end of the second decade of the
occupation. The higher cost of living in Israel and the external diseconomies produced by
congestion would have outweighed the benefits of greater efficiency and given way to
Table 1
Comparison of GDP per capita in Israel and the Palestinian Territories
Year (a Israel (1) West Bank & Gaza (2) Ratio (3) = (2) - (1)
1968-69 6,043 601 0.09
1975-76 8,163 1,026 0.13
1980-81 8,613 1,252 0.15
1985-86 9,051 1,264 0.14
1990-91 0,912 1,320 0.13
1995-96 (b 16,694 1,626 0.10
1997-98 16,492 1,523 0.09
1999-2000 17,300 1,504 0.08
Notes: (a Average of two years is taken to neutralize variations in the Palestinian GDP caused by the
cyclicality of the olive crops.
(b GDP per capita for 1995-2000 are in current prices.
Source: Calculated by using Statistical Abstract of Israel (1998, 2000): World Bank (1993: 135,
Table 1) and MAS (2000).
                                                
14 For analysis of the cost of agricultural products, see Awartani (1994), and for similar analysis related
to garments, pharmaceuticals, and shoes, see Makhool (1996).8
increased investments in the Palestinian economy. Increased economic activities in the
Palestinian territories would then have gradually corrected the distortion in the labour
market by reducing the number of Palestinians seeking daily work in Israel. The spread
effects would have certainly asserted themselves and generated a process whereby
Palestinian income was created endogenously in the internal productive sectors, rather
than outside. Instead, we see that the relation between the two economies has followed
quite a different path.
As is shown in Table 1, the Palestinian economy benefited significantly from its relation
with Israel in just the first decade, and then that relationship became harmful. In the first
decade the Palestinian GDP per capita grew from nine per cent of that of Israel to fifteen
per cent, but then the ratio declined continuously, and at the start of the limited self-rule
was almost at the level of a quarter of century before. Thus, in the first decade of
occupation the relation between the two economies went through a process of
convergence; the poor economy grew at a rate faster than the rich economy. Afterward,
the process was reversed and became one of divergence, with the rich economy growing
at a faster rate. The reason for this reversal is that the economic relationship between the
two economies was not confined to the working of the polarization and spread effects
operating through the market. The policies practised by Israel since the start of
occupation, which increased in intensity and aggressiveness in the mid-1970s, have
circumvented the forces in the market, bolstering the effects of polarization and
diminishing the spread effects.
These policies and practices include the following measures.
3.1 Restriction on the use of natural resources
Since the start of the occupation, the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip have
increasingly lost control over their land and their supply of water. The Israeli authorities
used many different and complex measures and policies, all of which were designed to
place under Israeli control the largest possible area of land, and the maximum amount of
water. It is widely believed that by the time of the establishment of the Palestinian
limited self-rule, Israel had confiscated 68 per cent of the total land of the West Bank,
and 40 per cent of that of Gaza Strip (UNCTAD 1996: 98). On the other hand, estimates
indicate that Palestinians in the West Bank use only about 15 to 20 per cent of the
annually available water originating in the area. The rest is used by Israeli settlers and
within Israel (World Bank 1993: vol IV: 54). New Jewish settlements were built on part
of the land taken from Palestinian use and control. The rest of the confiscated land was
turned into closed military areas. By the end of 1991, the number of these settlements
had reached at least 156 in the West Bank and 18 in Gaza Strip, with a population of
250,000.15 These Israeli policies toward land, water, and settlements have created an
atmosphere of conflict, strife, and uncertainty, with a profoundly negative effect on all
economic activities. The direct adverse effect was felt most strongly in agriculture,
where the area of irrigated land has declined by 6 per cent, and where prices of land and
water increased to a very high level (World Bank 1993, vol IV: 20). This distortion of
prices, combined with the refusal of the Israeli authorities to allow for the normal
                                                
15 By 1997 the population had reached 346,500. See the Foundation for Middle East Peace, available at:
www.fmep.org.9
expansion of municipal boundaries, has also resulted in high building costs for new
industrial plants, and thus acted as a strong barrier to industrial expansion.
3.2 Restrictions on the economic activities of the productive sectors
In addition to the removal of land and water from Palestinian control, the Israeli
authorities have followed a general practice aimed at changing the structure and
performance of the Palestinian economy. All economic activities were placed under the
scrutiny of the Israeli military administration in the territories, and  every economic
undertaking required its approval. Plans by Palestinian businessmen to start new
ventures, or to expand old ones, were often frustrated by delays in granting the
appropriate permit, or in outright denial. Permits were required for all activities related
to the acquisition of land, the construction of buildings, the transformation of goods, and
export and import activities.
The taxation of Palestinian business activity was equally detrimental. Palestinian firms
have had to pay value-added tax (VAT) on all their imports of raw materials through
Israel. The long delay in receiving the refunds of this tax caused these firms severe
problems of cash flow and shortage of capital. This has resulted in an annual loss
estimated to be 8 to 12 per cent of the value of their finished products (World Bank
1993, vol III: 16).
While these measures distorted incentives, and increased the risk to business activities,
investment was further discouraged by the underdevelopment of effective financial
intermediation in the Palestinian economy. This reflected the fact that all Arab banks
were closed at the beginning of the occupation and only reopened on a very small scale
in the mid-1980s.
Another important restriction is related to technological change and modernization. The
Israeli authority did not permit Palestinian firms to import machines and tools
incorporating the latest technology. Instead, they were compelled to buy second-hand
machines from Israel.
It should also be noted that the custom union arrangement Israel imposed on the
territories, was, in effect, an asymmetric trade scheme. This allowed Israel’s own
heavily subsidized products free entry into Palestinian markets but prevented the entry
of Palestinian products into the Israeli market, except on a selective and limited basis.
This asymmetric trade relation, combined with complex administrative procedures
aimed at discouraging Palestinian exports to the rest of the world, has made Palestinian
trade completely dependent on Israel. The fact that 90 per cent of all Palestinian imports
come from Israel presents one side of this forced dependency. The other side is shown
in the fact that Palestinians pay for these imports partly by exporting labour services to
Israel, and partly by exporting goods manufactured under subcontracting arrangements
with Israeli firms.
3.3 Resource transfer to Israel, and the neglect of the public sector
The forced integration of the Palestinian economy into that of Israel was associated with
a transfer of resources from the former to the latter. Three channels were involved. First,
Palestinians paid VAT and custom duties on products imported from Israel. It is10
estimated that half of the taxes paid by Palestinians in the Occupied Territories accrued
to the Israeli treasury in this way (Fischer et al. 1994: 120). The second source is the
income tax and social security contributions paid by Palestinians working in Israel. The
third was the seigniorage revenue Israel received because its currency was made legal
tender in the Occupied Territories. The total of these resource transfers is large, and
according to some estimates has reached, in any given year, from 15 per cent to a
quarter of the Palestinian GNP.16 Given that Israel was not prepared to undertake public
expenditures in the Occupied Territories beyond the tax revenues actually raised there
(as opposed to those paid by Palestinian consumers and workers but collected in Israel),
all public infrastructure in the West Bank and Gaza Strip is in a very poor state, and the
level and quality of public services and utilities are far below that of neighbouring
countries.17 The poor condition of the basic infrastructure and public services causes
market fragmentation, and this inhibits specialization and the realization of economies
of scale that are essential for a small economy to be competitive.
The cumulative impact of the foregoing restrictions on resource use, business activities,
and domestic and international trade has substantially weakened the traditional
productive sectors of the Palestinian economy. This has caused a general reallocation of
factors of production, combined with the reorientation of the trade flows, to the benefit
of Israel. As a consequence, a major structural transformation of the Palestinian
economy has taken place. It has become an economy characterized by two growing
disequilibria: a resource gap and labour market imbalance, and a great and unhealthy
dependence on external sources of income. It also features a sectoral disarticulation and
an infrastructure gap.
3.3 The resource gap
The Palestinian economy suffers from a chronic incapacity to generate more than
two-thirds of its national income. Usually, the yearly total domestic absorption
(domestic consumption and investment and government expenditures) is more than one
and a half times the economy’s total production (GDP). Imports fill this gap, and
assume a very important role in the economy. In the years preceding the establishment
of limited self-rule, the import surplus (imports over exports), measured as a percentage
of GDP, had reached 59 per cent and had never been less than 43 per cent (see Table 2).
The financing of these huge imports was generated mainly from the income of
Palestinians working in Israel, and the remittances of those working in the Persian Gulf
states. These factor incomes  account for the wide disparity between gross national
product (GNP) and GDP, and are also shown in Table 2.
Another manifestation of the resource gap and the central role played by factor incomes
is the investment-saving imbalance. Domestic savings in every year of the occupation
were negative. Thanks to factor income, however, national saving was positive, and
generated part of the funds needed for investment; the rest has been acquired from
foreign savings.
                                                
16 See Hamed and Shaban (1993) and Luski and Weinblatt (1994).
17 This Israeli behaviour is quite consistent with past British and French colonial behaviour in the
Middle East. One of their major underlying economic principles was that ‘colonies should pay for
themselves without recourse to special financial assistance from the metropolis’. See Owen and
Pamuk (1999: 52).11
Table 2
The resource gap (%)
1968 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 1998 2000
Import surplus (a 34 59 45 56 39 37 42 65
Investment surplus (b 43 24 16 15 5 28 28 36
GDP/GNP 107 78 80 77 75 93 86 87
Notes: (a Defined as (imports - exports) / GDP;
(b Defined as (investment - saving) / GNP;
Source: Calculated by using World Bank (1993: Table 1), and a memo issued by the Palestinian National
Authority (Ministry of Finance) October 1998, and UNCTAD (2001).
3.4 The labour market imbalance
The mirror image of the resource gap is the imbalance in the labour market between the
growing supply of labour, reflecting both a high natural rate of growth and the age
structure of the population, and the limited capacity for employment due to the hostile
economic environment of the occupation. Between 1972 and 1987 the labour force
increased by around 50 per cent, while domestic employment increased by 27 per cent
in the West Bank, and 18 per cent in Gaza Strip. The difference was mainly absorbed by
the Israeli market, in which employment of Palestinians from the West Bank increased
by 80 per cent, and from Gaza strip by 163 per cent, in the same period. Table 3 shows
the main features of the labour market.
Table 3
The labour force imbalance (thousands)
1968 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 1997 2000
Labour force 146.6 206.6 218.5 251.5 307.8 497.2 572.7 787.0
Number of employed 128.0 264.7 215.7 242.1 297.0 402.9 444.9 592.0
Percentage of employed in Israel (%) 0.0 32.4 34.8 36.8 36.4 16.1 16.1 16.9
Unemployment rate (%) 13.1 0.9 1.3 3.6 3.7 18.2 22.1 37.0
Source: Farsakh (1998: Tables 2 and 5) and UNCTAD (2001).
3.5 The sectoral distortion
While the resource gap and the labour market imbalance portray weaknesses of the
Palestinian economy at the macro level, the sectoral distortion pertains to the underlying
causes of this weakness at a micro level. Table 4 presents the Palestinian sectoral shares
in GDP, along with those of neighbouring countries. The harmful structural
transformation noted above is revealed by the fact that the share of agriculture in
Palestine is the highest, and its share of industry is the lowest. It is striking that the
Palestinian agricultural share is more than four times that of Jordan, while its share of
industry is little more than half that of Jordan.12
Table 4
The sectoral disarticulation: Sectoral share in GDP (%)
Palestine Jordan Egypt Israel
Agriculture 25 6 18 2
Industry 10 17 30 22
Construction 14 7 na 10
Services 48 37 52 65
Source: The figures for Palestine are calculated as an average of two years to smooth the olive cycle.
They are taken from estimations of the UNCTAD Secretariat for the years 1992-93. The rest of
the figures are calculated for 1991 at current prices (World Bank 1994: Table 1.2).
3.6 The infrastructural gap
Fiscal compression and under-investment as well as neglect in the public sector have
made the Palestinian economy seriously deficient in most infrastructures and public
services. Table 5 shows that the Palestinian economy is lagging behind in all
infrastructure provision compared to its neighbours. Transportation and sanitation are in
dire straits. Almost all the major roads in the West Bank and Gaza Strip were
constructed before 1967, and have received minimal maintenance during the years of
occupation. Sanitation is in a health-threatening condition, as only 25 per cent of
households in the West Bank and Gaza Strip are connected to sewerage networks.
Garbage collection is deficient and poses a major health hazard. One feature of Table 5
is especially noteworthy; at the regional level, Israel is ranked first, and the Palestinian
territories last in infrastructural provision.
Table 5






















































Population 55.0 3.9 2.4 4.0 13.0 5.1 1,152.6
Per capita income, US$ 650 1,120 1,450 2,500 2,800 13,500 1,620
Electric supply kw per 100 people 21.0 25.0 13.0 32.0 30.0 82.0 21.5
Electric power system loss, % 14.0 19.0 30.0 na na 4.0 12.4
Households with sanitation, % 50 100 25 na 63 100 —
No. of phones per 100 people 4.3 7.0 3.1 9.3 4.1 37.1 7.9
Metres of paved road per 100 people 39 170 80 na 180 266 —
Note: (a Lower middle income countries.
Source: Diwan and Shaban (1999).
4 The economics of limited self-rule during the interim period
The gradual establishment of Palestinian limited self-rule in parts of the West Bank and
Gaza Strip was the result of the implementation of several agreements between Israel
and the PLO. As a consequence, there was a transfer of power over some economic13
affairs from the Israeli Civil Administration (CA) to the Palestinian Authority. This
included the removal of direct restrictions on business activities: Palestinian firms could
now function without the crippling effects of permits and licenses previously required
by the CA. Notwithstanding the importance of this, however, it should be mentioned
that some of the indirect restrictions remain. These restrictions include the treatment of
indirect taxes, and the tariffs on consumer durables from neighbouring Arab countries.
The asymmetric custom union regime that characterized the economic relationship
between Israel and the Occupied Territories has changed in two directions under the
limited self-rule. First, many elements in the asymmetry have been removed. In
principle, Palestinian goods should receive the same treatment in Israel that Israeli
goods receive in Palestine. Second, some elements of a free trade area regime have been
introduced. The PA will have the freedom to choose its own tariff rates on three lists of
goods, including goods that can be imported from or through Jordan and Egypt.
While the monetary arrangements during the transitional period are an improvement
over those of the occupation, they are certainly not optimal. Arab banks reopened and
new ones were established, and behaviour is monitored by the Palestinian Monetary
Authority (PMA), which has some of the functions of a central bank but not the right to
issue national currency. The Israeli currency (the shekel) and the Jordanian currency
(the dinar) are used as legal tender. Thus the monetary arrangements combine some of
the worst aspects of two polar-type exchange rate regimes. The absence of a national
currency renders monetary policy ineffective, as in a fixed exchange rate regime. On the
other hand, the existence of a two-currency standard has the potential for increasing
those costs associated with fluctuations in exchange rates typical of a flexible exchange
rate regime. In addition, a dual currency tends to reduce the ability of commercial banks
to perform their function of transforming debt maturities, because of the problem of
currency mismatching inherent in portfolios. This discourages them from extending
long-term loans, which are essential for investment and growth.
Under the limited self-rule, some of the resource transfers to Israel have been
eliminated. Seventy five per cent of the income tax collected from Palestinians working
in Israel, and 100 per cent of the income tax collected from those working in Jewish
settlements, will be reimbursed to the PA. Israel is also required to transfer to the PA all
VAT on goods purchased in Israel by Palestinian firms. However, the resource transfer
from the Palestinian economy to the Israeli economy has not been eliminated.
Palestinian imports from the rest of the world, which must pass through Israel, still
generate custom duties received by Israel and not transferred to the Palestinian
Authority. This happens because Palestinian wholesalers and firms use Israeli traders to
import from the rest of the world. A common practice of these traders is to include the
Palestinian imports as part of imports destined to Israel (not the West Bank and Gaza
Strip). Accordingly, customs paid by Palestinians on these imports accrue to Israel and
are not transferred to the PA, as is the case of Palestinian imports from Israel destined to
the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Obviously, there is no precise way of measuring the
exact size of this forgone revenue, but recent studies have estimated it to be around
one-third of total tax revenue and around 3 per cent of the Palestinian GDP (Naqib
1996). It should be noted, too, that Israel still collects seigniorage revenue since its
currency is still legal tender in the Palestinian areas.
The most important feature of the limited self-rule is related to sovereignty and natural
resources. In the Declaration of Principles (DoP), it was agreed that there would be no14
change in sovereignty over land, water, and settlements during the transitional period.
These issues are left to be negotiated as part of the final settlement. Consequently, the
restrictions imposed on the Palestinian use of land and water remain completely intact.
The substantial restriction on the use of irrigation water in the West Bank, and the
diversion of water from aquifers for use in Israel and its settlements, will continue to
harm Palestinian agriculture, and prevent any serious move to expand and diversify
crops. As of June 1997,
Israel directly controlled 40 per cent of the land of Gaza Strip and 74 per
cent of the West Bank, the latter being known as Area C. In Area C,
Israel has full authority over zoning, building, and land registration. In
those West Bank lands (approximately 23 per cent) under both
Palestinian and Israeli authority (Area B), the Israeli government
maintains complete control over land registration procedures. It is only in
Area A (approximately 3 per cent) of the West Bank that Palestinians
exercise full control over land disposition (Roy 1998: 20).18
It should be noted that the Israeli authorities retain full control over all borders, which
implies control over the movement of labour and goods between the Palestinian
territories and the outside world. Furthermore, the conditions under which the limited
self-rule has been implemented have caused geographic segmentation with harmful
economic effects. According to a World Bank report, the new situation ‘split up the
West Bank and Gaza into a number of largely separate economic units with little
economic interrelationship among them, breaking up an already small domestic market
into even smaller ones’ (Roy 1996: 61)
Furthermore, the awkward arrangements of the limited-self rule have created a
multidimensional uncertainty that is discouraging to both domestic and foreign
investment. A prospective investor can obtain a license for starting business from the
PA, but bringing capital, goods, and people for that investment from outside needs the
approval of the Israeli authorities. The investor has to operate without any knowledge of
the future trade and monetary arrangements. How easy will it be to export to Arab
countries, the European Union (EU), or the United States? Will there be a Palestinian
currency and foreign exchange controls?
Yet, none of these aspects of Israeli control, profound as they are, is the most crippling
aspect of the limited self-rule. The interim period received its severest blow with the
continued building of new Jewish settlements and the expansion of existing ones.19 The
growth of settlement activities since the signing of the DoP in 1993 is an unambiguous
indication that the peace process, as exemplified by the limited self-rule, did not address
the root of the problem; the continuing Israeli infringement of Palestinian sovereignty.
In just two years after the signing of the DoP, the following Israeli activities took place
(see PHRIC 1995):
                                                
18 This situation remains the same at the time of writing (June 2002).
19 The Palestinian side maintains that confiscating land and building Jewish settlements violate the spirit,
if not the letter, of the Oslo Accord since it alters facts on the ground, thus prejudicing the negotiation
of final settlement.15
i)  Confiscation of 55,000 dunums20 of Palestinian land (see Table 6);
ii)  An area of 17,860 dunums bulldozed by settlers without being officially
confiscated;
iii)  Direct expansion of existing settlements by 8,993 dunums;
iv)  Uprooting of 28,752 trees;
v)  Chemical destruction (poisoning) of thousands of trees in the West Bank by
settlers; and
vi)  Use of 11,433 dunums for road construction to link settlements by bypassing
Arab population centres.
All of these activities have increased in scope and intensity in the last five years,
especially in Palestinian lands surrounding the city of Jerusalem. Indeed, immediately
after signing the Wye Accord in October 1998, then-Foreign Minister Ariel Sharon
counselled the settlers to make haste by ‘grabbing hilltops’ before land was turned over
to the Palestinians. Israeli peace groups report that 16 new settlements were set up in the
five months after the Wye Accord was signed at the White House.21 The Labour
government that came afterward followed the same policy. During its tenure
(June  1996-January 2001), the number of settlers increased by 22,419 (FMEP,
March-April 2001).22 In the first nine months of the new Likud government under the
Sharon leadership which was elected in February 2001, 25 new settlements sites were
established in the West Bank, all between 200-2000 metres away from an existing
settlement. The last FMEP report (June 2002) indicates that during the seven years of
Palestinian limited self-rule the number of Jewish settlers has doubled.
Table 6
 Israeli confiscation of Palestinian land (1990-97)
Confiscated land (dunum)









Source: For 1990-95, Palestinian Human Rights Center (PHRIC); for 1996, approximate numbers based
on data provided by PHRIC; for 1997, Annual Report of the Palestinian Society for the protection
of Human Rights and the Environment: Jerusalem.
                                                
20 One dunum equals to 1/4 acre.
21 See the New York Times, 3 March 1999.
22 The Foundation for Middle East Peace (FMEP) issues periodical reports monitoring the Israeli
settlement activities in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.16
It should come as no surprise, therefore, that the peace process did not eliminate the
basis of conflict, strife, and violence. Nor is it surprising that after seven years of limited
self-rule, the economic condition in the Palestinian areas is as bleak as it was under the
occupation; the general well-being of the Palestinian people in the West Bank and Gaza
Strip has undoubtedly deteriorated since the establishment of the limited self-rule.
According to a survey conducted by the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics
(PCBS), real per capita average expenditure in the 1995-96 survey period was about 15
per cent below its average for the years 1992-93. This deterioration in the standard of
living is also manifested by the growing gap between Israeli and Palestinian per capita
income. Table 1 shows that after 30 years of imposed integration between the two
economies, the gap between them has expanded, signifying a dominance of the
polarization effects over the spread effects. This adverse trend is also demonstrated in
the performance of the Palestinian economy at the macro level, as exemplified in the
continuance of the resource gap and the labour market imbalance (see Tables 2 and 3).
The steady deterioration of the Palestinian economic situation, the building of new
Jewish settlements and the expansion of the old ones, together with the failure of the
American sponsored conference at Camp David to reach agreement,23 combined to
heighten the Palestinian sense of frustration, anger, and helplessness. On 28 September
2000, an Israeli provocation created the spark that inflamed the Palestinian popular
uprising (Al Aqsa Intifada).24
Since the beginning of the Intifada, Israel has imposed a total closure on the Palestinian
territories that caused serious dislocation of the Palestinian economy with huge losses of
income. Closures comprise two types. During border closure, Palestinians are not
allowed to enter Israel (including East Jerusalem) or travel to Jordan and Egypt,
effectively isolating them from the rest of the world. During internal closure,
Palestinians are not allowed to move among urban centres within the West Bank or to
and from the surrounding villages. As a result of imposing these two kinds of closure
for long periods since October 2000, the Palestinian territories have turned into small
isolated islands surrounded by the Israeli army, and this fragmentation has hampered the
movements of goods and factors of production. The Palestinian economy’s resources
have been damaged, with losses according to UN estimates being between
US$ 1.8-2.5 billion  in  the  first  eleven  months (UNCTAD 2001: 6). These include
declining incomes from Israel (accounting for around 20 per cent of the total losses) as
well as declines in most domestic sectors. In addition, indirect losses involving
destruction of infrastructure are estimated at well over US$ 200 million for the first six
months of the Intifada. Unemployment grew rapidly, sharply reaching 30-40 per cent in
                                                
23 The DoP stipulated an interim period (1994-99) during which Israel was to withdraw from specified
areas in the West Bank and Gaza, transfer authority to the Palestinian Authority, and conduct with the
PLO negotiations to reach a final peace settlement over issues of refugees, Jerusalem, borders, Jewish
settlements, and security. However, five years passed without completion of the Israeli withdrawals,
and without starting negotiations over permanent settlement. Alarmed by this failure, President
Clinton brought the two sides to Camp David (July 2000) with the intention of bypassing the gradual
steps as specified by the DoP, and move directly to a final agreement. But the conference collapsed
without reaching any agreement.
24 Ariel Sharon, the leader of the right-wing Likud party, made a provocative visit to the cite of Al-Aqsa
mosque known as Harem Al-Sharif, or Noble Sanctuary, on 28 September 2000. The visit was
intended to reaffirm the Israeli claim that the cite should be forever under Israeli sovereignty as it is
the cite of Temple Mount.17
the West Bank and well over 50 per cent in the Gaza Strip. The spread of poverty has
reached an alarming level. It is estimated that in August 2001, 60.8 per cent of
households, or 2.03 million individuals, were living below the poverty line (US$ 2.10
per person per day). In the Gaza Strip the situation was more acute with 81.5 per cent of
households reporting an income below the poverty line compared to 50.3 per cent of
households in the West Bank.25
The economic situation took a drastic turn for the worse in March-April 2002, after the
Israeli army reoccupied most of the West Bank and imposed total curfew on the
inhabitants of major cities.
5 Conclusion
One major theme has emerged from the analysis of this paper concerning the Israeli
policies toward the Palestinian economy in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. During the
occupation period (1967-94), those policies were responsible for weakening the
productive sectors of the economy through the creation of distortion and disequilibria,
and engendering crippling dependency on the Israeli economy. Obviously, a relation
between two neighbouring countries in which measures taken by one can cause the
other to lose overnight the income of one-third of the labour force, and interrupt quite a
substantial portion of its imports and exports, is simply untenable. The
disproportionality—in what might be called the cost of dissociation—renders the
Palestinian-Israeli relationship unstable. It was also demonstrated that, despite some
progress in institution building, regulatory and economic policy formation made during
seven years of limited self-rule brought about by the Israeli-Palestinian accords, the
harsh occupation environment did not actually change in any significant manner. In fact,
increased uncertainty and political strife have aggravated the economic situation in the
last three years, and resulted in sharp declines in Palestinian households’ income,
massive unemployment and increased poverty.
The failure of the limited self-rule points to a fundamental contradiction of the peace
process which started with the signing of the DoP in 1993. On the one hand, the
ultimate goal was to achieve a historical compromise between the two peoples through a
two-state solution to the conflict; one Jewish and one Palestinian. On the other hand, the
gradual step by step trajectory allowed Israel to continue its policies of land
confiscation, the building of new Jewish settlements, and the attainment of complete
control over borders, all of which undermined the emergence of viable Palestinian state.
The experience of the last seven years has shown that the Oslo Accord is flawed and
does not have the potential for achieving a peaceful settlement. A new accord that
recognizes the fundamental Palestinian right of sovereignty over their land is needed so
that the two-state solution can become a viable solution to the conflict.
A new environment free of conflict over sovereignty, and a clear and well-defined
authority over economic activities can take the Palestinian economy a long way toward
a higher path of development and growth. Such a new and enabling environment would
                                                
25 These figures are taken from a survey conducted by the Palestine Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS).
See The Jerusalem Times, 5 October 2001.18
cement a new economic relation between the two economies that could exploit
possibilities of complementarity and rationalization, and acknowledge the need of the
Palestinian economy to use measures to safeguard itself against dependence upon one
major trade partner.
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